Abstract
It is fair to say that of all the sectors of the New Zealand economy, manufacturing has been most affected by the restructuring and deregulation policies since 1984. The fall in manufacturing jobs (over 80,000 1980-1990) explains over 75% of the net increase in unemployment Gone are the days when in New Zealand a young person could leave school at 15 and get a reasonable job in the dairy factory, freezing works or the Ford Motor Company. These jobs still exist, but they are dramatically fewer in number and there has been an upgrading in the 'skill level' required.
In 1982 I visited a small factory making a towist-market product in a small New Zealand rural town. They then employed 15 worlcers, only three in sales management, distribution or marketing. Today they still employ about 12 workers in production, but the process is far more mechanised, they produce three times the output and their total labour force has doubled, all the increase being in sales, management, distributing and marketing. Now this increase in employment is actually unusual for New Zealand, but this case illustrates the dramatic increase in productivity and the change in the skills and orientation of employment
The industrial landscapes of our largest cities lie strewn with the deserted monoliths of a by-gone industrial era. In Wellington for example one can view in relatively close proximity in Petone, the former Gear meatworks, the New ZealandMotorCorporationassemblyplant,theFordMotor Company assembly plant, and General Motors: the list could go on to include many smaller firms that have closed or shifted. This period of unprecedented decline in the manufacturing work force (labelled variously as restruc-tming, de-industrialisation, or simply industrial change) stands out against three decades of growth in the industrial worlc force. Table 1 shows for example that in the 1950s manufacturing employment increased over 37,100 (23.1 %); in the 1960s it was over 75,000 (a massive 37.9%); by the 1970s it increased another 45,000 (16.9%); but in the 1980s it declined by over 82,000 (-25.9%).
The obvious question arises: what has produced this cataclysmic change in a relatively short space of time? To answer this question we must examine the historical development of New Zealand manufacturing, and the changing political economy within which it has developed. New Zealand manufacturing: inefficient, underdeveloped, and overprotected?
A combination of three factors seemed to ensure the early direction for New Zealand manufacturing. Firstly the isolation from major sources of imports in the 19th century meant that we were forced to develop a wide range of industries given our size and population, at a time when the sailing ship voyage from England to New Zealand took on average 110 days. Secondly the small dispersed nature of the cash-strapped colonial economy meant that rampant laissez-faire capitalism never really flourished, and the government always had to pick up the tab for major investments and regulations. Thirdly the prevailing political culture favoured this anyway. The govenunent came to be looked upon as friend and provider. In this political and cultural soil the welfare state flourished at a uniquely early stage, and it was but a short step to full blown Keynesian Philpott (1990) economic policies of intervention, regulation, and protection.
Natural isolation meant that the tariff was the main weapon used for industrial protection. This was until the fall in freight costs along with the effects of the Great Depression meant that New Zealand's manufacturing sector was seen to be vulnerable. Import licensing was therefore introduced in 1938, ostensibly to limit imports for balance of payments reasons. But this more absolute form of protection quickly became the accepted way of ensuring the growth of manufacturing employment in New Zealand until the 1980s. Even as late as 1979 Minister of Finance Muldoon restated the traditional view:
It has been suggested that New Zealand should dismantle the system of import licensing which has operated for forty years. I do not subscribe to that view. I have no intention of letting efficient industries go to the wall for the sake of a theory (Wooding 1989:94) .
It is interesting that Muldoon had referred to 'efficient' firms. The irony was that many of the regulations governing New Zealand industry had been introduced in the so called Industrial Efficiency Act of 1936. In reality New Zealand firms were not efficient at all compared to their overseas counterparts. The problem lay in the fact that import licensing was a very absolute form of protection compared with tariffs and therefore New Zealand firms only had to adjust to the demands of local competition, not the international market This meant that in the period of rapid post-war growth when many advanced economies were shedding industrial jobs in declining industries, upgrading their manufacturing technology, and exporting on a large scale, New Zealand manufacturers remained cosseted in their protected home market without the incentive to change or upgrade to the same extent Not only was the New Zealand manufacturing sector over regulated, but it was also overprotected. Elkan (1972) calculated that we had the most heavily protected manu- facturing sector in the O.E.C.D., even aknowledging that data on effective rates of protection are notoriously difficult to calculate, especially when import licensing is considered. Table 4 shows that levels of effective protection increased during the 1960s then fell again up to 1979, but were still high in absolute tenns.
The safe operation in a protected home market ensured that by and large the New Zealand manufacturing industry was not export-oriented. Table 5 shows that by 1980 some industry groups had begun to increase exports quite considerably, but in some of the large employment groups such as metal products and machinery, the percentage of total output exported was very small This is highlighted when one compares similar figures for an export-oriented country like Switzerland. A recent figure from the New Zealand Manufactmers Federation claims that exports rose to about 23% of total manufacturing output in 1994.
Now the above analysis is, like all analyses, something of a simplification. Various National Party governments had sought to reduce the coverage of import licenses, but it still basically covered those industries most likely to be affected by foreign competition.
From 1962 to 1978 successive governments acknowledged the need for a more outward looking posture for Sources: 1 and 2 Elkan (1972 :70, 81-82) 3 O'Dea (1980 manufacturing, but tended to see this as being fulfilled by attention to export promotion. In this vein various export taxation incentives were introduced meaning that significant numbers of firms began to dabble in exporting if only to get cheap overseas trips. Willis, in a study of 100 engineering finns carried out in 1970, found that in only 20% did exports make up more than 20% of total sales, and for 65% of finns exports made up less than 10% of total sales. In addition over 95% of these firms were exporting mainly to Australia and some 50% under the provisions of N.A.F.T .A. (Willis 1972) . This Australia/New Zealand Free Trade Agreement had begun in 1966 and had paved the way for the closer Economic Relationship which developed later in the 1980s.
Also there had been far-sighted government ministers who had realised the importance of industrial change. Brian Talboys for example wrote in 1980 Successful countries do not cling to outmoded or uncompetitive industries or technologies. They allow them to decline whether through the invisible hand of the market place, or the invisible boot of the planning agency in countries like Japan -and employ their resources elsewhere. The process goes by different Therefore ten years after the National Development Conference (N.D.C.) had passed this recommendation the National government embarked on what W ooding calls 'A Cautious Liberalisation' (W ooding 1989: 94) This liberalisation included a wider free trade agreement with Australia, import license tendering, the industries study programme, and the recognition by government of the need to reduce the uneveMess of levels of manufacturing protection.
The Industries Studies Programme in particular was interesting because of the political furore it caused; in retrospect it was rather tame compared to what Roger Douglas was to introduce later. Back in 1978 the Tariff Review Committee had identified eleven industry groups for fur- 1984+ 1985+ 1984+ 1984-88 1984-88 1985-92 1987 1987+ 1987 reserve ratio requirements, priorities for various sectors) Removal of foreign exchange controls 1984-86 1984 1985 1985 1986-88 1986+ 1987+ 1988+ 1986 Liberalization of foreign direct investment Floating of the exchange rate Revision of corporate, personnel, and direct taxation Corporatization of stage trading activities Programme of sale of state assets Review of education and health provision Removal of monopoly rights on state trading Review of competition regulation: Commerce Act/Bank Act/ Securities Act/Companies Act Deregulation of transport sector Deregulation of financial services sector Partial deregulation of energy sector Removal of concessions for favoured investment (e.g. R&D) 1986-89 1983-88 1986 1986+ 1984+ 1984+ 1983+ 1987+ 1989+ 1989 1989 1989 1990 1990 Removal of concessions for favoured sectors (agriculture, export sectors) Establishment of closer economic relations with Australia Reorganisation of core government departments Reform of local government Deregulation of ports and waterfront work Removal of shop trading hours restrictions Corporatisation of some local authority trading activities Partial deregulation of shipping Resource management law reform Source : Savage and Bollard,(1990) ther study because of their need for continuing high assistance. Some of these studies were to be carried out by government departments and others by the I.D.C. (Industries Development Commission), called the Industrial Destruction Commission by the Unions. In effect the Industries Studies Programme was the last attempt at 'planned restructuring· before the market realities ofRoger Douglas after 1984. In fact the impact of the Industries Studies Programme was largely obliterated by the wider changes needed under the C.E.R. arrangement with Australia (signed 1982), just as the programme of trade liberalisation under C .E.R. was taken over by more general liberalisation policies post 1984.
In summary the point being made here is that some deregulation/liberalisation had begun prior to 1984 through the Industries Studies Programme, the review of licensing, the C.E.R. agreement and other indirect initiatives such as the deregulation of the freight transport industry. But change was still slow and much of this so called liberalisation took place at the same time as Muldoon' s National 348 government imposed a wages and price freeze to try and curb inflation. The real changes were still to come.
What happened after 1984?
Savage and Bollard detail three types of liberalisation affecting the New Zealand economy post 1984 (Savage and Bollard 1990: 37-38) .
Firstly there was macro-economic liberalisation. This is basically those policies not designed to be industry specific but have impacted on firms by altering the prices of inputs or outputs, or by directly influencing the economic environment in which firms operate.
Secondly there were the reductions in protection and subsidies including the phase out of import licensing, moves toward lower tariffs, and withdrawal of various production subsidies both implicit and explicit Tbe results of cbange.
There is little doubt about the magnitude of the changes. turing jobs in the 1980s -nearly 26% of the manufacturing work force. Declines were particularly severe in textiles and clothing ( -48% ), and food, beverages and tobacco (-35%) while the losses were least severe in wood products (-4%), paper and printing (-2%), and base metals (-6%).
The publication of the New Zealand Business Activity Statistics for the first time in 1987 provided another useful data base from which to assess the changes in employment and output Table 7 shows changes in employment 1987- we saw that the transport equipment manufacturing industry had the highest rate of decline of any three digit industrial group. In retrospect this is hardly surprising given the level of protection and intervention in this industry: As Douglas Greer said:
An auto-assembly industry in New Zealand is essentially artificial. That is to say, its existence is dependent on the assistance regime established and maintained by 
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government (Greer 1990: 107) .
He went on to say; the cost of landing a fully assembled new car on the dock of Auckland is barely more than the cost of a knocked down kit in need of assembly by New Zealand labour. Thus it is somewhat inconsistent to say (as was said in the 1984 industrial plan) that despite greatly reduced protection it is the governments intention to retain the assembly sector but to have it efficient. It simply cannot be efficient by world standards; without substantial protection it would simply not exist (Greer 1990: 107) .
In fact rationalisation in the motor assembly industry has been going on for some time even before 1984. As table  10 shows. The numbers of establishments actuaJJy increased through the 1980s but employment fell away dramatically. and labour productivity in tenns of numbers of cars per employee also increased dramatically.
The initial round of changes were ushered in with the 1984 Motor Vehicle Industry Plan which removed import licenses for the CKD (Completely Knocked Down) unassembled vehicles, expanded the market for CBU (Completely Built Up) vehicles, reduced tariffs, abolished some sales taxes and removed hire purchase controls.
In 1987 as part of the Closer Economic Relation negotiation with Australia. and as part of general deregulation policy, the plan was revised and the deregulation and abolition of protection processes sped up. was mainly that Japanese suppliers who had previously left local assembly to New Zealand agents now bought into the assembly business themselves, including Honda, MitsubisbL and Nissan. Their buy-outs ushered in new manufactwing standards and work -place methodologies such as the celebrated 'Nissan Way' of manufacture.
There is little doubt that as a result of deregulation, lowering of protection, vertical integration, new labom relations and ownership changes, the New Zealand motor assembly industry has become much more efficient. that is in the narrowest sense of producing its output with the lowest cost of inputs. However the industry can never become efficient in the broader sense of international competition because of its small scale. It is common knowledge for example that some plants in Japan produce enough cars to satisfy the whole New Zealand market for all vehicles. The nation must therefore make ultimate decisions on whether it will keep the tariffs in order to protect the remaining assembly plants and the 2,300 jobs in New Zealand. However when total exports are examined in more detail the trends are not so good. 
